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We present an entangled-state quantum ryptography system that operated for the rst time
in a real-world appliation senario. The full key generation protool was performed in real-time
between two distributed embedded hardware devies, whih were onneted by 1.45 km of optial
ber, installed for this experiment in the Vienna sewage system. The generated quantum key was
immediately handed over and used by a seure ommuniation appliation.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum ryptography [1℄ is the rst tehnology in the
area of quantum information that is in the proess of
making the transition from purely sienti researh to
an industrial appliation. In the last three years, sev-
eral ompanies have started developing quantum ryp-
tography prototypes and the rst produts hit the market
[2, 3, 4℄.
Up to now, these ommerial produts are all based
on various implementations of the BB84 [5℄ protool. Be-
ause of the unavailability of true single-photon soures,
today's ommerially available quantum ryptography
systems rely on photons from attenuated laser pulses,
as an approximation of the single photon state. How-
ever, the produed state has a non-vanishing probability
to ontain two or more photons per pulse, leaving suh
systems prone to an eavesdropping through a beam split-
ter attak. Although this attak is onsidered in reent
seurity proofs given for the BB84 protool [6, 7℄, a true
single photon soure is oneptually preferable.
An elegant alternative is quantum ryptography based
on entangled photon pairs [8℄, whih does not depend
on photons from attenuated laser pulses. In our im-
plementation of entangled-state quantum ryptography
we make use of pairs of single photons, whih are in-
dividually ompletely unpolarized. Information is only
stored in orrelations between the results of measure-
ments on the individual photons of a pair. With today's
entangled photon soures the probability of double pair
emissions is muh lower than the probability of double
photon emission in weak oherent pules systems. There-
fore entangled-state quantum ryptography systems are
loser to the original idea of quantum ryptography. Fur-
thermore, it an be shown [9℄ that entanglement-based
systems have a better performane in ertain situations.
Additionally the randomness of the generated key as re-
quired for a seure one-time-pad ipher [10℄ is guaran-
teed by the quantum randomness of the measurement
Figure 1: A quantum ryptography system is installed
between the headquarters of a large bank (Alie) and
the Vienna City Hall (Bob). The beeline distane
between the two buildings is about 650m. The optial
bers were installed some weeks before the experiment
in the Vienna sewage system and have a total length of
1.45 km.
proess, whereas in attenuated laser quantum ryptogra-
phy the random enoding has to be ahieved by using an
external random number generator. Thus, a fundamen-
tal point is that in entangled-state quantum ryptogra-
phy the key omes spontaneously into existene at both
measurement stations while in the BB84 protool it still
has to be transmitted from Alie to Bob. Experimen-
tally, entangled-state quantum ryptography has been
rst demonstrated in 1998 using polarization-entangled
photon pairs [11, 12℄. Alternative shemes are based for
example on energy-time entanglement [13℄. Reent devel-
opment of ompat, highly eient soures for entangled
photons [14, 15, 16℄ make entangled-state quantum key
distribution in real-life appliations feasible.
In this artile we present an entangled-state quantum
ryptography prototype system in a typial appliation
senario. In the experiment reported here, it was possible
2to distribute seure quantum keys on demand between
the headquarters of an Austrian bank and the Vienna
City Hall (see Figure 1) using polarization-entangled pho-
ton pairs. For key generation both measurement stations
swithed randomly between omplementary bases [17℄ as
also employed in the BB84 protool. The produed key
was diretly handed over to an appliation that was used
to send a quantum seured online wire transfer from the
City Hall to the headquarters of Bank-Austria Credi-
tanstalt [23℄.
The quantum ryptography system used (see Figure 2)
onsists of the soure for polarization-entangled photons
loated at the bank, two ombined polarization analy-
sis and detetion modules and two eletroni units for
key generation. These two quantum ryptography units
whih handled the ve steps of seure key generation -
real-time data aquisition, key sifting, error estimation,
error orretion and privay ampliation - are based on
an embedded eletroni design and are ompatible with
lassial teleommuniation equipment. The quantum
hannel between Alie and Bob onsisted of an optial
ber that has been installed between the two experimen-
tal sites in the Vienna sewage system (by WKA / Ca-
bleRunner In.). The exposure of the bers to realisti
environmental onditions suh as stress and strain during
installation, as well as temperature hanges were an im-
portant feature of this experiment, as it shows that our
system not only works under laboratory onditions, but
also in a realisti quantum ryptography senario.
THE EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The entangled photon pairs used in our ryptography
prototype were produed using a ompat devie based
on type-II spontaneous parametri down-onversion[18,
19℄. Using a 16mW violet laser diode as pump soure, it
was possible to generate and loally detet about 8.200
pairs per seond. The photon pairs had a enter wave-
length of 810 nm and a FWHM bandwidth of 5.6 nm.
The visibility of the produed entangled state |ψ−〉 under
loal detetion was above 96%. For key generation one
photon of the pair was diretly sent to Alie's detetion
module (see Figure 2), while the other photon was sent to
the seond reeiver via 1.45 km of optial ber. The ber
used for the quantum hannel was single mode for 810 nm
and had an average attenuation of about 3.2 dB per kilo-
meter resulting in a total attenuation of 6 dB inluding
the onnetors. The ompensation of polarization rota-
tion in the bers was done using ber polarization on-
trollers. Alignment of the ontrollers was done oine
before the quantum ryptography protool was started,
using alignment software whih alulated and displayed
the quantum bit error rate of the transmission system
in real-time based on the single photon detetion events.
With two linear polarizers in both arms of the entangle-
ment soure the polarization ontrollers were adjusted to
ompensate for the arbitrary polarization rotation. It
turned out that the polarization was stable for several
hours, therefore online measurement and ompensation
for polarization drift was not neessary.
A prototype of a urrently developed dediated QKD-
hardware was used for the rst time in this experiment
[20℄. It onsists of three main omputational omponents
best suited to manage all signal aquisition and QKD
protool tasks. All three units are situated on a single
printed iruit board. The main task of the board is key
aquisition, i.e. the proessing of the signals deteted by
the four detetors on eah site of the QKD system.
The board handles also the synhronization hannel
and generates a strong laser pulse whenever a photon
ounting event is deteted at Alie's site. This is ensured
by a logial OR onnetion of the detetor hannels as
shown on Figure 2. The synhronization laser pulse is at
the wavelength of 1550nm and it is sent over a separate
single mode ber. The developed detetion logi is im-
plemented in a FPGA and runs at a sampling frequeny
of 800MHz, while employing a time window of 10 ns for
mathing the detetion events and synhronization sig-
nals. The synhronization mehanism allows an idential
realisation of the higher level eletronis at both sides and
thus enables the development of universal QKD devies.
The lassial ommuniation between the two devies
is arried over a TCP/IP onnetion, provided by an Eth-
ernet bridge.
When fully developed the QKD hardware will be
equipped with a full sale QKD protool modular library
allowing seamless interhange of relevant algorithms, as
well as an enryption library, omprising a number of
state of the art enryption algorithms in addition to the
standard one-time pad. In addition to the main "em-
bedded" modus, the libraries an be used in a developer
modus - in the framework of an alternative omputing
environment (PC, et.).
In the urrent experiment the high speed eletronis
had only been used for measuring detetor events, hene,
it worked in a developer mode passing the data to an
outside PC running the protool software stak and a
graphial user interfae (GUI). The library modules uti-
lized in the urrent experiment inlude data aquisition,
error estimation, error orretion, implementing the algo-
rithm CASCADE [21℄, privay ampliation and a proto-
ol authentiation algorithm, ensuring the integrity of the
quantum hannel [22℄, using a Töplitz matrix approah.
Furthermore the enryption-library modules applied in-
lude one-time pad and AES enryption shemes, the lat-
ter allowing key exhange on a sale determined by the
user.
The average total quantum bit error rate (QBER) was
found to be less than 8%, for more than the entire run
time of the experiment. An analysis of the dierent on-
tributions to the QBER showed that about 2.5% omes
3Figure 2: Sketh of the experimental setup of the experiment. An entangled state soure pumped by a violet laser
diode (LD) at 405nm produes polarization-entangled photon pairs. One of the photons is loally analyzed in Alie's
detetion module, while the other is sent over a 1.45 km long single-mode optial ber (SMF) to the remote site
(Bob). Polarization measurement is done randomly in one of two bases (|0◦〉 and |45◦〉), by using a beam splitter
(BS) whih randomly sends inident photons to one of two polarizing beam splitters (PBS). One of the PBS is
dened to measure in the |0◦〉 basis, the other is the |45◦〉 basis turned by a half wave plate (HWP). The nal
detetion of the photons is done in passively quenhed silion avalanhe photodiodes (APD). When a photon is
deteted in one of Alie's four avalanhe photodiodes an optial trigger pulse is reated (Syn. Laser) and sent over
a seond ber to establish a ommon time basis. At both sites, the trigger pulses and the detetion events from the
APDs are fed into an dediated quantum key generation (QKG) devie for further proessing. This QKG eletroni
devie is an embedded system, whih is apable of autonomously doing all neessary alulations for key generation.
from imperfetions of the detetion modules, 1.2% from
the imperfet prodution of the entangled state. As these
two ontributions are pratially not aessible to eaves-
dropper [24℄ we subtrated these ontributions for onsid-
eration in privay ampliation. The rest of the QBER
an be attributed to the error produed by the quan-
tum hannel. For the data presented in this artile, the
number of bits disarded in privay ampliation is auto-
matially adjusted to the number of bits dislosed during
error orretion and the QBER of the quantum hannel.
The average raw key bit rate in our system was found to
be about 80 bits/s after error orretion and privay am-
pliation. This value is mainly limited by the detetion
eieny of the avalanhe photo diodes used as well as
the attenuation on the quantum hannel.
SECURE KEY GENERATION
In this setion we present a subset of the data obtained
in our experiment. It overs 18 minutes of data aqui-
sition and key generation. Within that time period Al-
ie's detetors registered overall more than 12.8 million
ounts. The same number of synhronization pulses was
sent to Bob. After determination of oinidene events
and key sifting a total of 244765 bits remained for fur-
ther proessing by the lassial algorithms. For this pur-
pose, the raw data was ontinuously grouped into bloks
of approximately 2500 bits, whih where submitted in-
dividually to the following lassial protools. Publily
announing 25% of the bits in eah blok was done for es-
timating the quantum bit error (QBER) of the sifted key.
The average value of the estimated error rate and the real
error rate, alulated by diretly omparing Alie's and
Bob's sifted key after the experiment, was found to be
6.25% and 6.44% respetively. Even though the average
value of the estimated error rate mathes the real error
rate, the small sampling size gives strong deviations in
individual bloks.
The remaining 183574 bits after error estimation were
then submitted to the error orretion proess. Due to
the dislosing of bits during error orretion, the useable
key size has to be further redued to 110226. In the last
stage of the protool, privay ampliation redued the
error-orreted key depending on the estimated QBER
for eah individual blok, leaving a total of 79426 bits
for the nal seure quantum key. This orresponds to an
average key distribution rate of 76 bit/seond.
Results for individual bloks are presented on Figure
3. There the bloks have been ordered by the estimated
quantum bit error rate rather than the order of their a-
quisition. The aquisition time of the individual bloks,
plotted in the upper part of Figure 3, is almost onstant
and shows no orrelation with the error rate. Also there
the estimated error rate is shown in omparison with the
real error determined after the experiment. One an see
that the estimated error niely ts the real error rate.
Only for a small perentage of bloks, the error is over-
or underestimated. By inreasing the size of the individ-
ual bloks and therefore improving the sampling of the
4Figure 3: Results obtained during 5 minutes of the
running experiment. The ryptography devie worked
with bloks of raw data whih were estimated to onsist
of 2500 bits after sifting. Eah key blok was proessed
by the full quantum ryptography software onsisting of
key sifting, error estimation, error orretion and
privay ampliation (see text). The bloks in this
graph have been sorted by the QBER rather than the
order of their aquisition. (a) In the topmost graph one
an see estimated QBER for the individual bloks as
well as the real QBER determined by diretly
omparing the whole sifted key over subsequent
measurement data bloks being proessed by the devie.
This alulation was only done for evaluation of the
system and is obviously not possible online for a real
key exhange where it is replaed by error estimation.
Additionally one an see the time it took to aquire the
raw data of the given blok. (b)The graph in the middle
shows the length of the nal key, the number of bits
dislosed by CASCADE and the number of bits
disarded in privay ampliation. () In the lower
graph one an see the nal seure bit rate produed by
our system.
error estimation, this eet an be mitigated. The over-
and underestimation of the QBER an also be seen in
the seond graph of Figure 3, where the amount of bits
disarded by privay ampliation is plotted for the indi-
vidual bloks. In the last graph of Figure 3 the bit rate of
the individual bloks is shown. One an learly see the
expeted behavior: The number of nal bits is mainly
dominated by the estimated error rate.
CONCLUSION
The experiment reported here demonstrates the oper-
ation of an entangled-state quantum ryptography pro-
totype system. All alulations were done in real-time on
a distributed embedded system. Furthermore we demon-
strate the suessful run of our quantum ryptography
system in a real world appliation senario outside ideal
laboratory onditions. The results learly show that en-
tangled photon systems provide a good alternative for
weak oherent pulse systems, with the additional benet
of rendering the beamsplitter attak muh less eient
and thus being loser to the ideal BB84 quantum ryptog-
raphy idea than systems based on weak oherent pulses.
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